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Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, the focus 
of US foreign policy changed—and so did 
that of economic sanctions. Partly because 
of  increased  cooperation  within  the  UN 
framework, economic sanctions were im-
posed so routinely in the early 1990s that 
scholars called that period the sanctions 
decade. This proliferation sparked intense 
debate about the effectiveness of sanctions 
as a policy tool and moved US sanctions 
policy to the center of public discourse. 
Energized  both  by  studies  (notably 
Economic  Sanctions  Reconsidered  by 
the  Institute  for  International  Econom-
ics)  contending  that  economic  sanctions 
seldom  achieve  their  foreign  policy  goals 
and  by  intense  lobbying  on  the  part  of 
multinational corporations (mainly under 
the umbrella of USA*Engage), the Clinton 
administration and Congress attempted to 
reform US sanctions policy in the second 
half of the 1990s. Central to the reform ef-
fort were demands for more detailed cost 
analyses  of  economic  sanctions,  in  par-
ticular  US  unilateral  sanctions,  prior  to 
their imposition. 
The Institute for International Econom-
ics first entered the cost debate in 1997 
with a study measuring the impact of eco-
nomic sanctions on bilateral merchandise 
trade flows between the United States and 
sanctioned countries. The 1997 study uti-
lized  common  statistical  techniques—the 
gravity model uses ordinary least square 
regression analysis—to calculate the loss 
of bilateral trade in 1995 due to economic 
sanctions (Hufbauer, et al. 1997). 
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Preliminary  results  from  the  third  edition  of 
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered1  suggest that the 
proliferation  of  US  unilateral  sanctions  episodes 
slowed  markedly  in  the  latter  half  of  the  1990s. 
Several  high-profile  cases  were  launched  (notably 
against  India  and  Pakistan  in  the  wake  of  their 
nuclear tests in 1998), while others were inherited 
from the past (for example, Cuba and North Korea). 
On balance, however, far fewer unilateral sanctions 
were initiated in the late 1990s, and some sanctions 
were even lifted during this period.2
Given  these  changes  in  US  sanctions  policy, 
we decided to take another look at the impact of 
economic  sanctions  on  US  trade  flows.  Professor 
Andrew Rose, at the University of California Berke-
ley, made available his gravity model for this exer-
cise. Using Rose’s gravity model with the addition 
of sanctions variables, we recalculated the impact 
of sanctions on US bilateral merchandise trade in 
1995  and  made  new  calculations  for  1999.  Fur-
ther, we augmented the “mechanical” calculations 
of trade loss (based on regression coefficients) with 
our own “judgmental” calculations.
Rose’s Gravity Model
The case study approach adopted in Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered looks at changes in trade 
or investment from the “bottom up” by estimating 
the impact of specific export or import restrictions, 
financial sanctions, or aid reductions. By contrast, 
the gravity model is a “top down” approach that es-
timates the impact of sanctions on bilateral trade 
flows by using a regression equation. In the analy-
sis, a sanctions variable is only one of more than a 
dozen variables that explain bilateral trade. 
Each approach has advantages and disadvan-
tages.  Case  studies  provide  essential  information 
about the direct cost of economic sanctions both to 
particular sectors of the targeted economy and to 
US firms, industries, and communities that trade 
or invest in the target country. The gravity model, 
however, purports to measure both direct and indi-
rect merchandise trade effects, including the “repu-
tation” and “after-life” effects of sanctions. Gravity 
model coefficients for the impact of sanctions rep-
resent deviations from statistical norms, however, 
and do not capture country-specific or case-specific 
nuances. Moreover, the gravity model database cov-
ers only bilateral merchandise trade and not trade 
in services. Since services trade often dwindles in 
the face of sanctions, the gravity model coefficients 
may  underestimate  the  impact  of  sanctions.  For 
example, US sanctions against Cuba severely limit 
tourism, with a large impact that is not captured by 
a gravity model of merchandise trade. In addition, 
the gravity model does not capture the impact eco-
nomic sanctions may have on capital flows to and 
investment in the targeted countries.
The standard gravity model predicts that bilat-
eral trade increases with the size and wealth of two 
national economies (measured by GDP and GDP per 
capita)  and  decreases  with  the  distance  between 
them.  Andrew  Rose’s  gravity  model  also  includes 
several other explanatory variables that can be ex-
pected to influence trade flows—such as common 
language, common border, and membership in re-
gional trading blocs.
We  have  extended  Rose’s  gravity  model  to  in-
clude  dummy  variables  for  economic  sanctions. 
Further,  we  have  replaced  Rose’s  bilateral  trade, 
GDP,  GDP  per  capita,  and  distance  data  for  all 
country pairs with our own dataset and expanded 
the dataset to include data for countries subject to 
US  sanctions  during  the  years  in  question  (1995 
and 1999).3 The following section briefly describes 
the gravity model variables.
The initial dependent variable is two-way mer-
chandise trade for 1995 and 1999. We also ran sep-
arate regressions with US exports and US imports 
as dependent variables for each of the two years. 
Our dataset includes 175 countries (listed in appen-
dix A). The regression equation form is logarithmic-
linear, or log-linear, meaning that the equation has 
a linear form when all variables are expressed either 
in logarithmic form (for continuous variables) or as 
dummy variables (values of 0 or 1).4  The following 
independent (explanatory) variables are included in 
Rose’s model:5 
GDPi*GDPj Product of GDP of country 
pair measured in current 
dollars
GDPPCi*GDPPCj Product of GDP per capita 
of country pair measured in 
current dollars
1 Hufbauer, et al. (forthcoming). Preliminary results are based 
on around 195 observations of economic sanctions imposed 
after World War I.
2 Also see Carter (2002).  
3 Countries added were Afghanistan, Cuba, North Korea, and 
Yugoslavia.  The source for trade data was IMF, Direction of 
Trade Statistics; for GDP and GDP per capita, we relied on IMF, 
World Economic Outlook; distance calculations are based on CIA 
World Factbook, the “great-circle” method was used.
4 The regression equations use natural logarithms, i.e., loga-
rithms to the base e.
5 We replace Rose’s database for bilateral trade and the first 
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DIST Distance between two 
countries
AREAP Product of land areas in 
square miles
REGIONAL Dummy for regional trade 
agreement
COMLANG Dummy for common 
language
BORDER Dummy for common border
CUSTRICT Dummy for strict currency 
union
LANDL Dummy for landlocked 
country
ISLAND Dummy for island country
COMCOL Dummy for countries that 
were colonies after 1945 
with the same colonizer. (e.g. 
Angola and Mozambique, 
both colonies of Portugal)
CURCOL Dummy for country pair 
currently in colonial 
relationship 
COLONY Dummy for country pair 
that was ever in a colonial 
relationship (e.g. United 
States and United Kingdom)
COMCTRY Dummy for country pair that 
was part of the same nation 
during the year in question 
(e.g. United Kingdom and 
Bermuda)
Dummy Variables for Sanctions
To capture the effect of economic sanctions, we 
added a series of dummy variables to Rose’s basic 
model. We created a set of six dummy variables to 
indicate current or previous economic sanctions be-
tween two countries. Because sanctions take a vari-
ety of forms, we divided the cases into three catego-
ries according to the intensity of the sanctions—lim-
ited, moderate, or extensive. Variables LIM, MOD, 
and  EXT  indicate  sanctions  were  in  place  during 
the years in question (1995 and 1999). To evaluate 
whether sanctions continue to adversely affect trade 
even after they have been lifted (an “after-life”), we 
included dummy variables LIM*, MOD*, and EXT* 
representing cases where sanctions were not pres-
ent in the year under analysis but had been in place 
at any time during the previous 10 years. The fol-
lowing section briefly describes the three categories 
of sanction intensity. 
LIM.  These  are  minor  trade,  financial,  or  travel 
sanctions. This category includes up to four of the 
following  restrictions:  reduction  or  suspension  of 
economic aid; reduction or suspension of military 
aid; export restrictions on arms or limited dual-use 
technologies; prohibition of credits or credit guar-
antees  by  the  US  Export-Import  Bank,  Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation, Commodity Credit 
Corporation, or US Trade and Development Agency; 
objections  to  loans  from  international  financial 
institutions (e.g. World Bank); travel bans or visa 
restrictions; bans on the export or import of one or 
two goods; and diplomatic rebuffs. 
MOD.  These  are  broader  trade  or  financial  sanc-
tions,  with  five  or  more  of  the  restrictions  that 
would otherwise be classified as limited. Moderate 
sanctions also include more severe financial sanc-
tions such as investment bans or asset freezes and 
export restrictions that go beyond defense items or 
selective goods.
EXT. The extensive category is reserved for compre-
hensive trade and financial sanctions such as those 
in place against Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. 
Because the severity of economic sanctions fre-
quently changes, only restrictions actually in place 
during the year in question were taken into consid-
eration.  For  example,  while  Vietnam  was  subject 
to  comprehensive  trade  and  financial  sanctions 
for decades, by 1995 only very limited restrictions 
remained.  With  respect  to  past  sanctions  (LIM*, 
MOD*, and EXT*), the most severe restrictions in 
place at any time during the past 10 years deter-
mined the classification. 
When the sanctions dummy variables are added 
to Rose’s gravity model, the augmented regression 
equation is as follows:6
Log(TRADEij) = C + ß1log(GDPi*GDPj) + 
ß2log(GDPPCi*GDPPCj) + ß3log (DIST) + 
ß4log(AREAP)+ ß5(REGIONAL) + ß6(COMLANG)+ 
ß7(BORDER) + ß8(CUSTRICT) + ß9(LANDL) + 
ß10(ISLAND) + ß11(COMCOL) + ß12(CURCOL) 
+ ß13(COLONY) + ß14(COMCTRY) + ß15(LIM) + 
ß16(MOD) + ß17(EXT) + ß18(LIM*) + ß19(MOD*) + 
ß20(EXT*)
General Results 
The  gravity  model  equation  as  specified,  in-
cluding  the  sanctions  dummies,  explains  about 
85 percent of the logarithmic variation in observed 
6 Natural logarithms (log) to the base e are used.Number PB03-4 April 2003 4






































17.5 374.0 -356.5 6.3 113.0 -106.7 4.0 208.0 -204.0
Cuba 149.0 3,190.0 -3,041.0 107.0 1,920.0 -1,813.0 33.3 1,720.0 -1,686.7
Iran 149.0 3,190.0 -3,041.0 55.8 1,000.0 -944.2 36.0 1,860.0 -1,824.0
Iraq 98.3 2,100.0 -2,001.7 39.9 717.0 -677.1 20.7 1,070.0 -1,049.3
Libya 100.0 2,140.0 -2,040.0 55.1 991.0 -935.9 17.0 878.0 -861.0
North 
Korea
16.9 361.0 -344.1 6.4 115.0 -108.6 3.2 164.0 -160.8






19.6 419.0 -399.4 8.6 154.0 -145.4 3.4 175.0 -171.6
Total 563.8 12,063.0 -11,499.2 284.0 5,097.8 -4,813.8 120.3 6,216.0 -6,095.7
Table 2  Mechanical estimates of bilateral merchandise trade lost due to extensive economic sanctions in 
place in 1999 (excluding nonsignificant coefficients) (millions of dollars) 
Table 1  Mechanical estimates of bilateral merchandise trade lost due to extensive economic 
sanctions in place in 1995 (excluding nonsignificant coefficients) (millions of dollars) 




































Cuba 40.8 3,870.0 -3,829.2 58.2 2,440.0 -2,381.8 0.2 1,640.0 -1,639.8
Iran 27.2 2,580.0 -2,552.8 23.8 998.0 -974.2 0.2 1,470.0 -1,469.8
Iraq 5.3 506.0 -500.7 4.9 205.0 -200.1 0.0 250.0 -250.0
Libya 15.7 1,490.0 -1,474.3 18.0 756.0 -738.0 0.1 734.0 -733.9
North 
Korea






5.6 530.0 -524.4 5.5 229.0 -223.5 0.0 242.0 -242.0
Total 96.8 9,184.0 -9,087.2 112.3 4,709.4 -4,597.1 0.6 4,434.4 -4,433.8Number PB03-4 April 2003 5
bilateral trade flows. This result indicates that the 
model fits the data well (see appendices D to I). The 
standard gravity model variables, such as economic 
size, distance, regional trade agreement, and com-
mon language, all have the anticipated signs and 
are statistically significant. Because we focus on US 
bilateral  trade,  variables  related  to  contemporary 
colonial linkages dropped out. 
Impact of Current Sanctions
Our primary interest is the impact that current 
economic sanctions have on bilateral trade flows. As 
would be expected, extensive sanctions have a large 
depressing effect on bilateral trade flows, and the 
coefficients are highly significant. Extensive sanc-
tions in place in 1995 reduce total bilateral trade 
flows by about 99 percent and US exports by about 
98 percent (appendices D and E).7 The impact of ex-
tensive sanctions was slightly less in 1999, reducing 
total bilateral trade by 95 percent and US exports 
by 94 percent (appendices G and H). The easing of 
some long-standing trade embargoes, such as those 
against North Korea, Cuba, and Iran, to permit US 
exports of food and medicine may explain the less 
draconian coefficients for 1999.
The estimated coefficients for limited and mod-
erate sanctions, however, are not statistically signif-
icant at the usual levels of confidence. These coun-
terintuitive results suggest that limited and moder-
ate sanctions have little or no impact on bilateral 
trade flows. Ignoring statistical significance and just 
looking at the signs, the coefficients for limited and 
moderate sanctions in 1995 are negative (with a few 
exceptions). However, the coefficients for 1999 are 
positive, suggesting that trade actually increases in 
the presence of sanctions.8
In  our  1997  study,  using  a  different  gravity 
model, we concluded that limited sanctions had no 
impact on bilateral trade flows in 1995. However, 
we found that moderate sanctions had a significant 
negative impact. With the exception of China, the 
target  countries  confronted  by  moderate  sanc-
tions remained the same for both studies—Angola, 
Burma, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria. One explana-
tion for the different statistical estimates is that the 
number  of  bilateral  country  pair  observations  for 
countries not under US economic sanctions includ-
ed in our current study is about double the number 
included in the 1997 study.9
“After-life” of Sanctions
In  addition  to  the  direct  and  chilling  impact 
on bilateral trade, the adverse effects of economic 
sanctions  may  linger  after  they  have  been  lifted. 
Banning  capital  equipment  exports  today  means 
lower  exports  in  the  future  because  markets  for 
replacement  parts  and  follow-up  technologies  are 
lost. Business ties are broken and may take time 
to reestablish. US firms may be regarded as unreli-
able suppliers and countries may avoid buying from 
them out of fear that, in the future, US suppliers 
might be caught up in another sanctions episode. 
To assess whether the effects of sanctions indeed 
linger,  we  included  dummy  variables—LIM85*94, 
MOD85*94, EXT85*94 and LIM89*98, MOD89*98, 
EXT89*98—representing  cases  where  sanctions 
had been in place during the previous 10 years.
We find little evidence to support the argument 
that  sanctions  continue  to  suppress  trade  after 
they have been lifted. With the exception of limited 
sanctions  in  the  1985-94  period  (LIM85*94),  the 
coefficients for past limited and moderate sanctions 
are not statistically significant. In fact, our results 
suggest  that  trade  can  significantly  pick  up  after 
sanctions have been lifted. The extensive sanctions 
dummy variables (EXT85*94, EXT89*98) have posi-
tive signs and are statistically significant at the 95 
percent confidence level. The cases in question are 
Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, and Vietnam. For these 
countries, the “bungee-cord” results might be ex-
plained by catch-up purchases in the aftermath of a 
severe sanctions episode. 
Estimated Loss of Trade 
To estimate the loss of US exports due to eco-
nomic  sanctions,  we  employed  two  methods—one 
model-based, the other judgmental.
7 The percentage change in trade is calculated as follows. First 
find the value of the natural number e taken to the estimated 
coefficient as an exponent. Then subtract that value from 1.00. 
For example, the coefficient for extensive sanctions in 1995 
(EXT95) is -4.554. The value of the natural number e taken to 
the exponent -4.554 is 0.01. Subtracting that value from 1.00 
gives a change of 0.99. This indicates that bilateral trade was 
99 percent lower between two countries owing to economic 
sanctions.
8 Our results are confirmed by a similar gravity model study 
done at the George Washington University Center for the Study 
of Globalization. Using three different samples of economic 
sanctions across a time series of 19 years (1980–98), the au-
thors find that in the case of two samples, the coefficients for 
limited or selective sanctions are mostly positive and statisti-
cally insignificant. The coefficients for Cold War export controls, 
however, are negative and statistically significant at the usual 
levels of confidence. Their estimates for severe sanctions are 
all negative and statistically significant, suggesting a reduction 
of trade between the United States and a targeted country of 
around 61 to 97 percent. See Askari, et al. (2003).
9 In addition, we used more control variables in the current 
study than the 1997 study. However, when we ran the current 
regression equation with the same control variables as the 1997 
study, moderate sanctions still showed no effect. Number PB03-4 April 2003 6






Angola Mod 49.1 55.9 -6.8
Azerbaijan Lim 17.3 17.6 -0.3
Bulgaria Lim 230.0 234.0 -4.0
Cambodia Lim 34.3 34.8 -0.5
Cameroon Lim 172.0 175.0 -3.0
China Mod 6,860.0 6,970.0 -110.0
Cuba Ext 58.2a 2,440.0a  -2,381.8a 
Czech Republic Lim 482.0 490.0 -8.0
Ecuador Lim 739.0 751.0 -12.0
Gambia, The Lim 14.6 14.8 -0.2
Guatemala Lim 1,460.0 1,480.0 -20.0
Indonesia Lim 1,570.0 1,590.0 -20.0
Iran Ext 23.8a  998.0a  -974.2a
Iraq Ext 4.9a 205.0a  -200.1a
Lebanon Lim 278.0 282.0 -4.0
Libya Ext 18.0a 756.0a  -738.0a
Myanmar (Burma) Mod 51.1 58.3 -7.2
Nigeria Lim 598.0 608.0 -10.0
North Korea Ext 1.9a  81.4a  -79.5a
Pakistan Mod 955.0 1,090.0 -135.0
Peru Lim 1,650.0 1,670.0 -20.0
Poland Lim 2,330.0 2,370.0 -40.0
Romania Lim 610.0 619.0 -9.0
Russia Lim 4,990.0 5,070.0 -80.0
Rwanda Lim 11.4 11.6 -0.2
Sudan Mod 75.7 86.3 -10.6
Syria  Mod 210.0 239.0 -29.0
Vietnam Lim 201.0 204.0 -3.0
Yemen Lim 134.0 136.0 -2.0
Yugoslavia, Federal Re-
public of
Ext 5.5a 229.0a  -223.5a 
Zaire (Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo)
Lim 60.7 61.7 -1.0




a. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The coefficients for limited (Lim) 
and moderate (Mod) sanctions are not statistically significant.
Table 3  Mechanical estimates of US merchandise exports lost due to economic sanctions in place
in 1995 (millions of dollars)Number PB03-4 April 2003 7






Afghanistan Ext 6.3a  113.0a  -106.7a 
Angola Mod 54.7 51.9 2.8
Azerbaijan Lim 40.4 31.9 8.5
Cambodia Lim 31.1 24.6 6.5
China Mod 6,800.0 6,440.0 360.0
Cuba Ext 107.0a  1,920.0a  -1,813.0a 
Guatemala Lim 1,920.0 1,520.0 400.0
India Lim 5,260.0 4,150.0 1,110.0
Indonesia Lim 1,020.0 803.0 217.0
Iran Ext 55.8a  1,000.0a  -944.2a 
Iraq Ext 39.9a  717.0a  -677.1a 
Libya Ext 55.1a  991.0a  -935.9a 
Myanmar (Burma) Mod 44.0 41.7 2.3
Niger Lim 15.6 12.3 3.3
North Korea Ext 6.4a  115.0a -108.6a
Pakistan Mod 848.0 804.0 44.0
Sierra Leone Lim 21.2 16.7 4.5
Sudan Ext 4.9a  87.8a  -82.9a 
Syria  Mod 222.0 211.0 11.0
Yugoslavia, Federal 
Republic of
Ext 8.6a  154.0a  -145.4a 





a. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.  The coefficients for limited (Lim) and moderate 
(Mod) sanctions are not statistically significant, but positive in 1999, thus leading to the counterintuitive result that US exports 
increase to countries under limited and moderate sanctions. 
Table 4  Mechanical estimate of US merchandise exports lost due to economic sanctions in place 
in 1999 (millions of dollars)Number PB03-4 April 2003 8
The  model-based  or  mechanical  estimates  are 
constructed by subtracting the gravity-model-pre-
dicted level of trade from the counterfactual level 
of trade in the absence of economic sanctions. For 
example, based on the size and wealth of the two 
economies (measured by GDP and GDP per capita), 
the  distance  between  them  and  the  fact  that  se-
vere economic sanctions were in place, the gravity 
model predicts that the value of US exports to Cuba 
in  1999  would  be  $107  million.  By  contrast,  the 
model estimates that the 1999 value of US exports 
to Cuba, if no sanctions were in place (the coun-
terfactual  calculation),  would  have  been  $1,920 
million. Thus the estimated loss of US exports to 
Cuba on account of severe economic sanctions was 
$1,813 million ($1,920 million minus $107 million, 
see table 4). Applying the model-based method to 
all sanctioned countries suggests that US bilateral 
merchandise trade flows (exports plus imports) with 
all sanctioned countries in 1995 were $9.1 billion 
lower than they would have been without sanctions 
(table 1). In 1999, bilateral trade flows were reduced 
by an estimated $11.5 billion (table 2). Expressed as 
a percentage of total US merchandise trade, these 
reductions amount to 0.7 percent for both years.
With respect to US exports, the impact of sanc-
tions is similar. Our mechanical estimates suggest 
a reduction of $4.6 billion in exports for 1995 and 
$4.8 billion for 1999 (0.8 percent and 0.7 percent 
of total merchandise exports—see tables 3 and 4, 
respectively).  If  the  statistically  nonsignificant  co-
efficients for limited and moderate sanctions were 
taken  into  account,  the  loss  of  exports  in  1995 
would  increase  to  $5.1  billion  (table  3).  If  taken 
into  account,  the  statistically  nonsignificant  co-
efficients  for  limited  and  moderate  sanctions  in 
1999 would actually reduce the loss of exports in 
that year (table 4).
For a number of countries, US exports predicted 
by the gravity model are substantially different (in 
absolute terms) from actual exports to the country 
in question. For example, the gravity model predict-
ed US exports to China in 1995 to be $6,860 mil-
lion, while actual US exports were $11,478 million. 
Similarly, based strictly on the gravity model, the 
United States would have exported $2,330 million 
worth of goods to Poland in 1995 but in fact only 
exported $776.3 million. (See tables 3 and 5.)  For 
this and other reasons, we also made judgmental 
calculations of the US trade loss. Our judgmental 
estimates are based on a mix of different methods. 
In some cases we have applied the statistical coeffi-
cients to actual US exports and imports to the sanc-
tioned countries. In other cases, we have looked at 
US trade with similar countries to calculate what 
US exports and imports might be in the absence
of sanctions.
Our judgmental figures are about twice as large 
as the mechanical calculations. Based on our judg-
mental  estimates,  total  US  bilateral  merchandise 
trade  flows  (exports  plus  imports)  with  countries 
targeted  by  extensive  sanctions  were  reduced  by 
$24.8 billion in 1995 and $25 billion in 1999 (tables 
5 and 6).10
The judgmental results suggest that extensive 
sanctions reduced US exports by around $9.3 bil-
lion  in  1995  and  $9.1  billion  in  1999  (table  5).11   
Using these figures, lost US exports on account of 
extensive sanctions amounted to 1.6 percent of total 
merchandise exports in 1995. Lost US exports in 
1999 amounted to 1.3 percent of total merchandise 
exports, suggesting that the relative cost of exten-
sive sanctions has decreased slightly.
As mentioned earlier, because the gravity model 
only  takes  into  account  changes  in  merchandise 
trade  and  not  trade  in  services,  it  may  underes-
timate the total cost of economic sanctions to the 
US economy. In 1999, the United States exported 
around  $272  billion  worth  of  services.  Assum-
ing economic sanctions would have a comparable 
impact on services trade as on trade in goods in 
terms  of  percentages  of  total  bilateral  trade,  the 
United States may have lost $6.6 billion in bilateral 
services  trade  ($3  billion  in  services  imports  and 
$3.6 billion in services exports) owing to sanctions 
(tables 5 and 6).
When  sized  against  the  vast  US  economy,  or 
even total trade, sanctions seem to exert a small 
economic  impact.  If  spread  evenly,  the  costs  of 
sanctions  would  be  equivalent  to  a  very  low  rate 
of tax. But the costs of sanctions are never spread 
evenly. The US trade embargo against Libya primar-
ily affects the US oil services industry. Given that 
industry’s geographic concentration, Texas is com-
paratively more burdened by the Libyan embargo. 
By the same token, while US trade with China has 
increased  tremendously  over  the  last  decade,  ex-
ports  of  high-technology  and  dual-use  goods  are 
still restricted. To cite just one more example, the 
long-standing US embargo on Cuba arguably has a 
much larger impact on Florida than on other states. 
Within the United States, specific firms and com-
munities are disproportionately affected. 
10 If limited and moderate sanctions are included in the calcula-
tions, the loss of bilateral trade might total $40.6 billion in 1995 
(tables 5 and 6). Based on the econometric coefficients, limited 
and moderate sanctions did not reduce bilateral trade flows 
in 1999.
11 If limited and moderate sanctions are included in the 
calculations, the loss of exports in 1995 might be $11.4 billion 
(table 5).













Czech Republic 362.7 -5.8
Ecuador 1,538.4 -24.8







Myanmar (Burma) 16.1 -2.3
Nigeria 602 -9.7











Yugoslavia, Federal Republic ofe n.a. -675.0
Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) 76.9 -1.2




Estimated loss of services exportsg -- -3,550.9
   
* Countries included in this estimate are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
n.a. = not available











North Koread 11.3 -106.0
Sudan 7.2 -122.3
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep 58.2 -988.8
Total merchandise 167.2 -9,084.0
Estimated loss of services
exportsg
-- -3,620.0
   
a Estimated exports to Cuba based on model-predicted reduction of exports.
b Estimated exports to Iran calculated as US share of industrial-countries exports to Saudi Arabia (28 percent for 1995, 35 percent 
for 1999) multiplied by industrial-countries exports to Iran.
c Estimated exports to Iraq and Libya calculated as (US exports in the last year before sanctions) multiplied by (world exports in 1995 
or 1999) divided by (world exports in the last year before sanctions).
d Estimated exports to North Korea calculated as US share of industrial-countries exports to South Korea (31 percent for 1995, 35 
percent for 1999) multiplied by industrial-countries exports to North Korea.
e Estimated 1995 exports to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia calculated as estimated 1995 US exports to all of Yugoslavia less 
observed exports to Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina.
f For countries other than those specifically noted, the reduction in US exports is estimated as (actual 1995 or 1999 exports) divided 
by (the econometric estimate of percentage decrease in exports) minus (actual 1995 or 1999 exports).
g Loss of services exports calculated as US total exports of services in 1995 or 1999 multiplied by (estimated reductions of US mer-
chandise exports in 1995 or 1999) divided by (total US merchandise exports in 1995 or 1999).













Czech Republic 439.3 -309.3
Ecuador 2,158.0 -1,519.3







Myanmar (Burma) 86.9 5.7
Nigeria 5,054.9 -3,558.8











Yugoslavia, Federal Republic ofe n.a. -602.5
Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) 273.4 -192.5
Total merchandise 76,745.8 -29,242.0
Total merchandise excluding non-
significant coefficients*
0.2 -15,519.2
Estimated loss of services importsi -- -3,022.0
   
* Countries included in this estimate are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
n.a. = not available
Table 6  Judgmental estimates of US merchandise imports lost in 1995 and 1999











North Koread n.a. -115.1
Sudang 3.4 -172.1
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of 6.0 -303.7
Total  4,287.9 -15,932.1
Estimated loss of services importsi -- -2,926.7
 
a Estimated imports from Cuba based on model-predicted reduction of imports.
b Estimated imports from Iran calculated as US share of industrial-countries imports from Saudi Arabia (28 percent for 1995, 32 per-
cent for 1999) multiplied by industrial-countries imports from Iran.
c Estimated imports to Iraq calculated as (US imports in the last year before sanctions) multiplied by (world imports in 1995 or 1999) 
divided by (world imports in the last year before sanctions).
d Estimated imports from North Korea calculated as US share of industrial-countries imports from South Korea (40 percent for 1995, 
43 percent for 1999) multiplied by industrial-countries imports from North Korea.
e Estimated 1995 imports from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Calculated as estimated 1995 US imports to all of Yugoslavia less 
observed exports to Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. 
f Estimated imports from Libya calculated as (ratio of US imports to other industrial-countries imports from Libya in the last year 
before sanctions) multiplied by (1995 or 1999 industrial-countries imports from Libya). 
g US imports for 1998 used as estimate of 1999 US imports from Sudan.  Reduction in US imports is estimated as (actual 1998 im-
ports) divided by (the econometric estimate of percentage decrease in imports) minus (actual 1998 imports)
h For countries other than those specifically noted, the reduction in US imports is estimated as (actual 1995 or 1999 imports) divided 
by (the econometric estimate of percentage decrease in imports) minus (actual 1995 or 1999 imports).
i Loss of services imports calculated as US total imports of services in 1995 or 1999 multiplied by (estimated reductions of US mer-
chandise imports in 1995 or 1999) divided by (total US merchandise imports in 1995 or 1999).  
Table 6  (Continued)References
Askari,  Hossein,  John  Forrer,  Hildy  Teegen,  and 
Jiawen Yang. 2003. U.S. Economic Sanctions: An 
Empirical  Analysis.  Occasional  Paper  Series  (24 
February).  Washington:  The  George  Washington 
Center for the Study of Globalization. www.gwu.edu/
~gwcsg.
Carter,  Barry.  2002.  Study  of  New  U.S. 
Unilateral  Sanctions,  1997-2001.  Washington: 
USA*Engage. www.usaengage.org/literature/2002/
2002sanctions/index.html. 
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Tess 
Cyrus, and Elizabeth Winston. 1997. US Economic 
Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages. 
Working  Paper  Special.  Washington:  Institute  for 
International Economics. 
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly 
Ann  Elliott,  and  Barbara  Oegg.  Forthcoming. 
Economic  Sanctions  Reconsidered,  3d  edition. 
Washington: Institute for International Economics.
Rose, Andrew K. 2002. Do We Really Know that the 
WTO  Increases  Trade?  NBER  Working  Paper  no. 
9273. Cambridge, MA: NBER (October). 
Rose,  Andrew  K.,  and  Reuven  Glick.  2001. 
Does  a  Currency  Union  affect  Trade?  The  Time 
Series  Evidence.  NBER  Working  Paper  no.  8396. 
Cambridge, MA: NBER (July). 
Number PB03-4 April 2003 13
Some  firms  and  communities  may  experience  se-
vere economic dislocation in the wake of sanctions 
that are intended to target foreign countries. Such 
important  realities  are  not  captured  in  aggregate 
measures of economic loss.
Finally, it should be recognized that the longer 
sanctions are in place, the greater the opportunity 
for both exports and imports to carve new channels. 
The  extensive  sanctions  listed  in  our  tables  have 
been in place against the target countries for de-
cades. It is reasonable to suppose that much of the 
“lost trade,” as calculated in this policy brief, now 
takes place through less efficient channels. When 
sanctions  are  removed,  the  old  channels  will  be 
restored, diverting commerce from the replacement 
channels. Total US trade will increase but not by 
the full amount of calculated lost trade.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. This publication is part of the
overall program of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily
reflect the views of individual members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.Number PB03-4 April 2003 14
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China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
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St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia

























Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Target country LIM95 MOD95 EXT95 LIM85*94 MOD85*94 EXT85*94
Angola 0 1 0 0 0 0
Azerbaijan 1 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 1 0 0 0 0 0
Cambodia 1 0 0 0 0 0
Cameroon 1 0 0 0 0 0
Chile 0 0 0 0 1 0
China 0 1 0 0 0 0
Cuba 0 0 1 0 0 0
Czech Republic 1 0 0 0 0 0
Appendix B  Sanctions dummy variables–1995
Sender country: United StatesNumber PB03-4 April 2003 16
Target country LIM95 MOD95 EXT95 LIM85*94 MOD85*94 EXT85*94
Ecuador 1 0 0 0 0 0
El Salvador 0 0 0 1 0 0
Ethiopia 0 0 0 1 0 0
Gambia, The 1 0 0 0 0 0
Guatemala 1 0 0 0 0 0
Haiti 0 0 0 0 0 1
Hungary 0 0 0 0 1 0
India 0 0 0 1 0 0
Indonesia 1 0 0 0 0 0
Iran 0 0 1 0 0 0
Iraq 0 0 1 0 0 0
Jordan 0 0 0 1 0 0
Kenya 0 0 0 1 0 0
Lebanon 1 0 0 0 0 0
Liberia 1 0 0 0 0 0
Libya 0 0 1 0 0 0
Malawi 0 0 0 1 0 0
Myanmar (Burma) 0 1 0 0 0 0
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 1
Nigeria 1 0 0 0 0 0
North Korea 0 0 1 0 0 0
Pakistan 0 1 0 0 0 0
Panama 0 0 0 0 0 1
Peru 1 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 1 0 0 0 0 0
Russia 1 0 0 0 0 0
Rwanda 1 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 0 0 0 0 1 0
Sudan 0 1 0 0 0 0
Suriname 0 0 0 1 0 0
Syria 0 1 0 0 0 0
Thailand 0 0 0 1 0 0
Vietnam 1 0 0 0 0 0
Yemen 1 0 0 0 0 0
Yugoslavia, Federal 
Republic of
0 0 1 0 0 0
Zaire (Democratic Republic 
of Congo)
1 0 0 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 0 0 0 1 0 0
Appendix B  (Continued)Number PB03-4 April 2003 17
Target country LIM99 MOD99 MOD99 LIM89*98 MOD89*98 EXT89*98
Afghanistan 0 0 1 0 0 0
Angola (UNITA) 0 1 0 0 0 0
Azerbaijan 1 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 1 0
Cambodia (Khmer Rouge) 1 0 0 0 0 0
Cameroon 0 0 0 1 0 0
Chile 0 0 0 0 1 0
China 0 1 0 0 0 0
Colombia 0 0 0 1 0 0
Cuba 0 0 1 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 1 0
Ecuador 0 0 0 1 0 0
El Salvador 0 0 0 1 0 0
Ethiopia 0 0 0 1 0 0
Gambia, The 0 0 0 1 0 0
Guatemala 1 0 0 0 0 0
Haiti 0 0 0 0 0 1
Hungary 0 0 0 0 1 0
India 1 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia 1 0 0 0 0 0
Iran 0 0 1 0 0 0
Iraq 0 0 1 0 0 0
Jordan 0 0 0 1 0 0
Kenya 0 0 0 1 0 0
Lebanon 0 0 0 1 0 0
Liberia 1 0 0 0 0 0
Libya 0 0 1 0 0 0
Malawi 0 0 0 1 0 0
Myanmar (Burma) 0 1 0 0 0 0
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 1
Niger 1 0 0 0 0 0
Nigeria 0 0 0 0 1 0
North Korea 0 0 1 0 0 0
Pakistan 0 1 0 0 0 0
Pananma 0 0 0 0 0 1
Paraguay 0 0 0 1 0 0
Peru 0 0 0 1 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 1 0
Romania 0 0 0 0 1 0
Russia 0 0 0 0 1 0
Rwanda 0 0 0 1 0 0
Sierra Leone 1 0 0 0 0 0
Appendix C  Sanctions dummy variables–1999             
Sender country: United States             Number PB03-4 April 2003 18
Target country LIM99 MOD99 MOD99 LIM89*98 MOD89*98 EXT89*98
Somalia 1 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 0 0 0 0 1 0
Sudan 0 0 1 0 0 0
Syria 0 1 0 0 0 0
Thailand 0 0 0 1 0 0
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 1
Yemem 0 0 0 1 0 0
Yugoslavia, Federal 
Republic of 
0 0 1 0 0 0
Zaire (Democratic Republic 
of Congo)
0 0 0 1 0 0
Zambia 0 0 0 1 0 0
Appendix D  1995 econometric results, total bilateral trade











LIM95 -0.159 0.223 -0.71 -14.7
MOD95 0.077 0.736 0.10 8.0
EXT95 -4.554 1.077 -4.23 -98.9
LIM85*94 0.348 0.248 1.40 41.6
MOD85*94 0.156 0.250 0.62 16.9
EXT85*94 0.656 0.258 2.54 92.7
Gravity model continuous 
variables*
log of GDPi*GDPj 1.036 0.084 12.35
log of GDPPCi*GDPPCj -0.065 0.099 -0.66
log of DIST -1.060 0.223 -4.76
log of AREAP -0.056 0.057 -0.97
Gravity model dummy variables
REGIONAL 0.808 0.232 3.48 124.3
COMLANG 0.481 0.169 2.85 61.8
BORDER -0.121 0.489 -0.25 -11.4CUSTRICT -0.010 0.196 -0.05 -1.0
LANDL -0.703 0.227 -3.10 -50.5
ISLAND 0.057 0.270 0.21 5.9
COMCOL (dropped)
CURCOL (dropped)
COLONY 0.345 0.708 0.49 41.2
COMCTRY (dropped)
Constant
CON  20.056 3.162 6.34
Regression with robust standard 
errors
Number of observations 173
R-squared 0.8667
Root MSE 1.0518
*The regression coefficient on a continuous logarithmic variable can be interpreted as an elasticity, namely the 
percentage change in the dependent variable for each 1 percent change in the 
independent variable. For example, if the estimated coefficient on log (GDP) is 0.9, a 10 percent increase
in a country’s GDP is estimated to increase the dependent variable (trade) by 9 percent. 
** The regression coefficient on a positive dummy variable (variable =1) can be interpreted as 
a step increase in the independent variable.  For example, if the estimated coefficient for limited sanctions 
(lim) is -0.159, the percentage change in trade is calculated as follows.  The value of the natural number e 
taken to the exponent -0.159 is 0.852.  Subtracting that value from 1.000 gives a change of 14.8 percent. 
This means that bilateral trade was 14.8 percent lower between the two countries owing to limited
sanctions than it would have been if the sanctions were not in place. 
Appendix D  (Continued)
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LIM95 -0.016 0.208 -0.08 -1.6
MOD95 -0.131 0.471 -0.28 -12.3
EXT95 -3.735 1.109 -3.37 -97.6
LIM85*94 0.583 0.259 2.25 79.1
MOD85*94 0.303 0.329 0.92 35.4
EXT85*94 0.724 0.276 2.63 106.2
Gravity model continuous 
variables*
log of GDPi*GDPj 0.948 0.070 13.56
log of GDPPCi*GDPPCj 0.026 0.083 0.32
log of DIST -1.367 0.221 -6.18
log of AREAP -0.011 0.063 -0.18
Gravity model dummy variables
REGIONAL 0.990 0.278 3.56 169.1
COMLANG 0.485 0.166 2.92 62.3
BORDER -0.768 0.550 -1.40 -53.6
CUSTRICT 0.067 0.245 0.28 7.0
LANDL -0.767 0.231 -3.32 -53.6
ISLAND 0.044 0.275 0.16 4.5
COMCOL (dropped)
CURCOL (dropped)
COLONY 0.543 0.708 0.77 72.1
COMCTRY (dropped)
Constant
CON  20.064 2.724 7.37
Regression with robust standard
errors
Number of observations 173
R-squared 0.8709
Root MSE 1.0196
*  See appendix D note.
** See appendix D note.Appendix F  1995 econometric results, US imports










LIM95 -0.533 0.348 -1.53 -41.3
MOD95 0.068 0.947 0.07 7.0
EXT95 -8.904 0.217 -41.04 -100.0
LIM85*94 0.163 0.410 0.40 17.7
MOD85*94 0.185 0.300 0.62 20.3
EXT85*94 0.458 0.454 1.01 58.1
Gravity model continuous 
variables*
log of GDPi*GDPj 1.141 0.109 10.44
log of GDPPCi*GDPPCj -0.139 0.138 -1.01
log of DIST -0.995 0.278 -3.57
log of AREAP -0.051 0.071 -0.72
Gravity model dummy variables
REGIONAL 0.817 0.292 2.80 126.4
COMLANG 0.565 0.252 2.25 76.0
BORDER -0.122 0.598 -0.20 -11.5
CUSTRICT -0.484 0.299 -1.62 -38.4
LANDL -1.024 0.311 -3.29 -64.1
ISLAND 0.038 0.355 0.11 3.9
COMCOL   (dropped)
CURCOL   (dropped)
COLONY 0.188 0.818 0.23 20.6
COMCTRY   (dropped)
Constant
CON  18.664 4.133 4.52
Regression with robust standard
errors
Number of observations 166
R-squared 0.8186
Root MSE 1.3497
*  See appendix D note.









LIM99 0.383 0.397 0.96 46.6
MOD99 0.734 0.658 1.12 108.3
EXT99 -3.062 0.810 -3.78 -95.3
LIM89*98 0.086 0.251 0.34 9.0
MOD89*98 -0.055 0.279 -0.20 -5.4
EXT89*98 0.822 0.329 2.50 127.5
Gravity model continuous 
variables*
log of GDPi*GDPj 0.964 0.081 11.90
log of GDPPCi*GDPPCj 0.107 0.105 1.02
log of DIST -0.845 0.274 -3.08
log of AREAP -0.025 0.053 -0.47
Gravity model dummy variables
REGIONAL 0.749 0.238 3.14 111.4
COMLANG 0.529 0.171 3.10 69.8
BORDER 0.137 0.570 0.24 14.7
CUSTRICT -0.189 0.277 -0.68 -17.2
LANDL -0.542 0.200 -2.71 -41.8
ISLAND -0.008 0.309 -0.03 -0.8
COMCOL (dropped)
CURCOL (dropped)
COLONY 0.520 0.915 0.57 68.3
COMCTRY (dropped)
Constant
CON  14.973 3.560 4.21
Regression with robust standard 
errors
Number of observations 174
R-squared 0.8697
Root MSE 1.0172
*  See appendix D note.
** See appendix D note.









LIM99 0.236 0.220 1.07 26.6
MOD99 0.054 0.497 0.11 5.5
EXT99 -2.890 0.582 -4.97 -94.4
LIM89*98 0.288 0.240 1.20 33.3
MOD89*98 -0.188 0.232 -0.81 -17.1
EXT89*98 0.858 0.235 3.66 135.9
Gravity model continuous 
variables*
log of GDPi*GDPj 0.895 0.071 12.55
log of GDPPCi*GDPPCj 0.227 0.090 2.51
log of DIST -1.298 0.251 -5.16
log of AREAP -0.006 0.053 -0.12
Gravity model dummy variables
REGIONAL 0.749 0.255 2.93 111.5
COMLANG 0.625 0.180 3.47 86.8
BORDER -0.467 0.562 -0.83 -37.3
CUSTRICT -0.141 0.302 -0.47 -13.1
LANDL -0.575 0.203 -2.84 -43.7
ISLAND -0.146 0.303 -0.48 -13.6
COMCOL (dropped)
CURCOL (dropped)
COLONY 0.676 1.015 0.67 96.5
COMCTRY (dropped)
Constant
CON  16.077 2.942 5.46
Regression with robust standard 
errors
Number of observations 174
R-squared 0.8881
Root MSE 0.9507
*  See appendix D note.
** See appendix D note.









LIM99 0.419 0.604 0.69 52.0
MOD99 1.027 0.812 1.26 179.2
EXT99 -3.944 1.538 -2.56 -98.1
LIM89*98 -0.291 0.433 -0.67 -25.2
MOD89*98 0.156 0.330 0.47 16.8
EXT89*98 1.050 0.472 2.22 185.8
Gravity model continuous 
variables*
log of GDPi*GDPj 1.105 0.114 9.71
log of GDPPCi*GDPPCj 0.017 0.142 0.12
log of DIST -0.719 0.371 -1.94
log of AREAP -0.017 0.079 -0.22
Gravity model dummy variables
REGIONAL 1.020 0.299 3.41 177.2
COMLANG 0.478 0.244 1.96 61.3
BORDER -0.023 0.769 -0.03 -2.3
CUSTRICT -0.869 0.403 -2.16 -58.1
LANDL -0.422 0.319 -1.32 -34.4
ISLAND 0.361 0.420 0.86 43.5
COMCOL (dropped)
CURCOL (dropped)
COLONY 0.340 0.914 0.37 40.5
COMCTRY (dropped)
Constant
CON  12.751 4.946 2.58
Regression with robust standard 
errors
Number of observations 171
R-squared 0.7855
Root MSE 1.4789
*  See appendix D note.
** See appendix D note.
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